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Bad Behavior:
Health Insurance Mega-Mergers
Jacqueline C. Lien*

INTRODUCTION
2015 marked the beginning of a long battle for two major health
insurance companies. On July 3, 2015, health insurance giant and third
largest health insurance company by revenue, Aetna, announced that it
entered into an agreement to acquire the fifth largest health insurance
company, Humana, for $37 billion.1 Following a similar timeline, on July
24, 2015, second largest, Anthem, negotiated an even bigger merger with
Cigna, the fourth largest, for $54.2 billion.2 Officials from all four
companies lauded the benefits of the mergers, stating that the synergies
between the respective companies would result in enhanced health care
access, quality, and affordability for consumers, as well as transform the
market to a more “consumerfocused marketplace.”3 However, many,
including the Department of Justice, expressed concerns about the potential
impact the proposed megamergers would have on competition in the
health insurance industry. On July 21, 2016, the Department of Justice
launched a suit to block Aetna’s acquisition of Humana, as well as
Anthem’s acquisition of Cigna, citing concerns that the mergers would
harm competition by reducing the number of large, national health insurers
from five to three.4
In the midst of it all, Aetna’s CEO, Mark Bertolini, wrote to the
Department of Justice threatening that if the Department failed to approve

* Jacqueline C. Lien, J.D. 2018 at University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Press Release, Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion, Combines Entity to
Drive ConsumerFocused, HighValue Health Care, (July 3, 2015).
2. Ankur Banerjee & Ransdell Pierson, Anthem to buy Cigna, creating biggest U.S. Health
Insurer, REUTERS (July 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cigna-m-a-anthem-idUSKCN0PY
12B20150724 [https://perma.cc/SK7L-F29V].
3. Supra note 2; see also Aetna to acquire Humana, combined entity to drive consumer-focused,
high-value health care, ANTHEM (Aug. 24, 2015), https://news.aetna.com/2015/08/aetna-to-acquirehumana/ [https://perma.cc/NMX7-GMHZ].
4. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department and State Attorneys General Sue to
Block Anthem’s Acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s Acquisition of Humana (July 21, 2016).
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of the merger, Aetna would pull out of the Obamacare exchanges.5 The
Department persisted and five months later, Aetna followed through with
its threat withdrawing from markets in seventeen counties in Florida,
Georgia, and Missouri.6 Taking Aetna’s lead, Humana announced that
starting in 2018, they would no longer offer health insurance plans in the
state marketplace exchanges.7 A few months later, Anthem followed suit
stating that it would need to “assess the longterm viability of [its]
exchange footprint.”8
In an attempt to win over the new administration, Anthem stated its
support for the American Health Care Act and financially backed a number
of political support groups that have some influence over the proposed
merger. During their pursuit, Anthem remained relentless, even when faced
with several obstaclesboth internally and judicially. Their efforts to
merge with Cigna were not only aggressive but politically transparent.
Although both the mergers eventually failed,9 the tactics Aetna and Anthem
used to pursue their acquisitions raised significant concerns about their
market power. Anthem and Aetna’s behavior in their pursuit of their
respective mergers demonstrates that these health insurance companies
have become so big and powerful that they are willing to openly threaten a
federal agency that was currently investigating them for anticompetitive
behavior. The time has come for the federal government to take bold steps
to maintain some level of competition and fairness in the marketplace to
protect consumers.
This note analyzes the role of political gaming as it relates to mergers
and acquisitions of major health insurance companies and how it can
negatively impact consumers. More specifically, this note focuses on the
deceptive tactics that Aetna and Anthem displayed in their pursuit of their
respective acquisitions. Additionally, this note explains why the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice must investigate these
5. Scott Hensley, Aetna CEO To Justice Department: Block Our Deal and We’ll Drop Out of
Obamacare, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Aug 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/17/
490202346/aetna-ceo-to-justice-department-block-our-deal-and-well-drop-out-of-exchanges
[https://
perma.cc/NXH3-CDW2].
6. United States v. Aetna Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8409, 1992 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2017).
7. Reed Abelson, Humana Plans to Pull Out of Obamacare’s Insurance Exchanges. N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/health/humana-plans-to-pull-out-of-obamacaresinsurance-exchanges.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6HW4-NJKL].
8. Shelby Livingston, Anthem Warns of ACA Exchange Retreat In 2018, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161102/NEWS/161109978 [https://perma.
cc/YJU2-5UMV].
9. Ana Mulero, Anthem terminates Cigna merger, Healthcare Dive (May 12, 2017), http://
www.healthcaredive.com/news/breaking-anthem-terminates-cigna-merger/442637/ [https://perma.cc/
4WPM-M2HY]; see also, Rebecca Hersher, Aetna And Humana Call Off Merger After Court Decision,
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/14/515167491
/aetna-and-humana-call-off-merger-after-court-decision [https://perma.cc/N26S-SKZR].
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tactics in order to protect competition, prevent further market
consolidation, and ensure protection against big corporate insurance.
Further, this note explains how transitioning to a single payer system may
resolve the issues that stem from the proposed mega-mergers.
First, this note provides background information on the Aetna and
Anthem mergers. Then, Part I examines the negative impacts of health
insurance megamergers. Part II discusses the McCarranFerguson Act
and whether Aetna and Anthem are exempt from all federal regulation,
including federal antitrust regulation. Part III analyzes three separate
bodies of federal antitrust regulation: the Clayton Act, The Sherman Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Because the courts already
reviewed the mergers as a whole, Part III addresses whether the tactics that
Aetna and Anthem employed during their merger attempts violated those
laws, rather than whether the mergers themselves did. Finally, Part IV
argues that shifting from our current health insurance model to a single
payer system or hybrid system would drastically decrease the health
insurance companies’ ability to use their political power to their advantage.

BACKGROUND
AETNAHUMANA
In mid-2015, Aetna negotiated a merger with Humana for $37
billion.10 In anticipation of potential litigation, Aetna CEO Mark Bertolini
issued a letter to the Department of Justice11 outlining Aetna’s intent to
withdraw its participation in the exchanges if the Department of Justice
continued the suit to enjoin the merger with Humana.12 Aetna claimed that
the company was losing money from operating on the exchanges.13 The
company also claimed that the costs of litigation would be too much of a
financial burden for Aetna to bear.14 Thus, the merger would need to
succeed, otherwise they could no longer continue to turn a profit while still
participating in the exchanges.15 Many, including the court, considered the
letter to be a threat to the Department of Justice.16 The court itself said,
10. Chad Bray & Reed Abelson, Aetna Agrees to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion in Cash and
Stock, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/04/business/ deal
book/aetna-agrees-to-acquire-humana-for-37-billion-in-cash-and-stock.html [https://perma.cc/5EEE-52
UP].
11. Supra, note 6.
12. Letter from Mark Bertolini, CEO, Aetna Inc., to Dep’t. of Justice (July 5, 2016) (accessed at
big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/AetnaDOJletter.pdf).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Supra note 6, at 211; see also Hensley, supra note 5; see also Zachary Tracer, Aetna
Threatened to Quit Obamacare If Deal Blocked by U.S., BLOOMBERG (Aug 17, 2016); see also
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“Aetna . . . was willing to threaten to limit its participation in the
exchanges” and later addressed their withdrawal from 17 counties as Aetna
following through with their threat.17 An excerpt from the letter follows
below:
Our analysis to date makes clear that if the deal were challenged
and/or blocked we would need to take immediate actions to mitigate
public exchange and ACA small group losses. Specifically, if the DOJ
sues to enjoin the transaction, we will immediately take action to reduce
our 2017 exchange footprint. We currently plan, as part of our strategy
following the acquisition, to expand from 15 states in 2016 to 20 states in
2017. However, if we are in the midst of litigation over the Humana
transaction, given the risks described above, we will not be able to
expand to the five additional states. In addition, we would also withdraw
from at least five additional states where generating a market return
would take too long for us to justify, given the costs associated with a
potential breakup of the transaction. In other words, instead of expanding
to 20 states next year, we would reduce our presence to no more than 10
states. We also would not be in a position to provide assistance to failing
cooperative exchanges as we did in Iowa recently.18

After some consideration, the Department of Justice promptly
launched an antitrust case against Aetna in response to the proposed
merger, despite Aetna’s threat to pull out of the exchanges.19 Shortly after,
Aetna followed through with their threats, announcing that it would not
offer plans on the exchanges in 2017 in eleven of the fifteen states where
they had participated in 2016.20
ANTHEMCIGNA
On February 8, 2017, the District Court determined that the proposed
merger between Anthem and Cigna would substantially lessen competition
and result in higher premiums and fewer choices in the large employer
group market.21 During the court proceedings, discovery revealed tensions
between the two health insurance giants.22 This included a letter that
Jonathan Cohn & Jeffrey Young, Aetna CEO Threatened Obamacare Pullout If Feds Opposed Humana
Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2016).
17. Supra note 6, at 211,
18. Infra note 35.
19. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department and State Attorneys General Sue to Block Anthem’s
Acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s Acquisition of Humana, (July 21, 2016); see also supra note 6.
20. Supra note 6, at 207
21. Supra note 6, at 218.
22. Jimmy Hoover, Transcripts In Anthem-Cigna Trial Show Merger Tension, LAW360 (Nov. 29,
2016), https://www.law360.com/health/articles/866682/transcripts-in-anthem-cigna-trial-show-merger-
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Anthem CEO Joseph Swedish sent to Cigna CEO David Cordani, in which
Swedish called the implementation of the integration “unacceptable.”23
Discovery also revealed communications from an Anthem employee’s
email indicating that Anthem established an Anthemonly team to proceed
with the integration efforts “without Cigna’s knowledge or support” for a
number of merger issues.24 DOJ attorney Scott Fitzgerald also highlighted
a letter from the chairman of Cigna’s board of directors, which accused
Anthem of “taking actions that erode[d], rather than maximize[d], the value
to be achieved from the transaction.”25 Shortly after the District Court’s
ruling, Cigna announced that had exercised its right to terminate the
proposed merger with Anthem, stating that they believed that “the
transaction cannot and will not achieve regulatory approval and that
terminating the agreement is in the best interest of Cigna’s shareholders.”26
Cigna promptly filed a lawsuit against Anthem in the Delaware Chancery
Court to effect the termination and to seek $13 billion in damages in
addition to the $1.85 billion breakup fee as stipulated in the merger
agreement.27
Under the agreement, both Anthem and Cigna have the right to
terminate the agreement if the merger is not consummated by January 31,
2017, subject to extension to April 30, 2017.28 Shortly after the Delaware
Chancery Court filing, Anthem released a statement claiming that “Cigna’s
lawsuit and purported termination is the next step in Cigna’s campaign to
sabotage the merger and to try to deflect attention from its repeated willful
breaches of the Merger Agreement in support of such effort.”29 Anthem
then filed a suit against Cigna seeking a temporary restraining order to
enjoin Cigna from terminating the merger Agreement.30 Despite the
District Court’s ruling, the tensions between Anthem and Cigna, and the
Chancery Court case, Anthem maintained that it believed that there was
sufficient time and “a viable path forward” to complete the merger, which
would eventually benefit millions of Americans by saving them more than

tension?nl_pk=f8dd95dc-32ce-4f4c-aeb3adfabadb396e&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=health [https://perma.cc/RUQ8-RGEP].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cigna Corporation, Cigna Terminates Merger Agreement With Anthem, (Feb. 14 2017),
https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2017/cigna-terminates-merger-agreement-with-anthem
[https://perma.cc/L4K9-AX3M].
27. Id.
28. Merger Agreement, Anthem, Inc., Form 8-K, Item 1.01 (July 27, 2015).
29. Anthem, Inc., Anthem Files Suit Against Cigna Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order to
Enjoin Cigna from Terminating the Merger Agreement, Specific Performance Compelling Cigna to
Comply with the Merger Agreement and Damages, Press Release (Feb. 15, 2017).
30. Id.
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$2 billion in medical costs.31
Moreover, President Trump recently nominated Makan Delrahim to
the Department of Justice to serve as an Assistant Attorney General in the
Antitrust Division.32 Delrahim is an attorney who previously represented
Anthem during his time in private practice and even went on to lobby
Congress on behalf of Anthem on antitrust related issues regarding their
merger with Cigna.33 Delrahim’s appointment could have resulted in a
favorable outcome for Anthem. Court documents showed that Anthem was
confident that the merger was still viable under a new DOJ.34 Anthem
publically endorsed the American Health Care Act, which is proposed to
replace the Affordable Care Act.35 Anthem even went as far as to donate
$460,000 to groups supporting the election campaigns of certain governors
and state attorneys general.36 These included the Republican Governors
Association and the Democratic Governors Association.37 In many states,
governors appoint the insurance commissioners, who are responsible for
reviewing proposed mergers like the AnthemCigna merger.38 Anthem’s
political transparency and unwavering legal pursuit demonstrated the
lengths that they were willing to go to successfully acquire Cigna.

I. THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF
HEALTH INSURANCE MEGAMERGERS
Large health insurance companies like Aetna and Anthem have long
lauded the benefits of mergers like the ones they proposed. Aetna claimed
that the merger would allow them to offer “a broad choice of affordable,
consumer-centric health care products, [help] to constrain cost growth,

31. Id.
32. Melissa Lipman, Trump Names Makan Delrahim As DOJ Antitrust Chief, LAW360 (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/902548/trump-names-makan-delrahim-as-doj-antitrust-chief.
33. Shelby Livingston, Could Trump’s Top DOJ Antitrust Pick Help Seal the Anthem-Cigna
Deal?, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170328/
NEWS/170329919 [https://perma.cc/79Z4-E2NB].
34. Shelby Livingston, Anthem sees Trump’s DOJ as its Wingman, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb.
25, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170225/MAGAZINE/302259918 [https://per
ma.cc/BD32-5JRF].
35. Virgil Dickson, Anthem Backs GOP’S Obamacare Replacement, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170310/NEWS/170319992 [https://per
ma.cc/W458-XVLE].
36. David Sirota, Anthem-Cigna Deal: Seeking Merger Approval, Anthem Makes Major
Donations to State Political Groups, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/
political-capital/anthem-cigna-deal-seeking-merger-approval-anthem-makes-major-donations-state
[https://perma.cc/89AC-MQA2].
37. Id.
38. Id.
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improve health outcomes, and promote wellness.”39 Aetna also claimed
that the merger would provide them with the “enhanced ability to work
with providers and create value-based payment agreements” that would
result in better care to the consumers.40 Anthem CEO Joseph Swedish
issued similar sentiments in a press release announcing the merger with
Cigna.41
However, health insurance markets in the United States are already
highly concentrated. In a study done by the American Medical Association
(AMA), researchers found that seventy-two percent of the healthcare
markets surveyed were highly concentrated according to the HerfindalHirschman Index (HHI).42 Mergers within markets that are already highly
concentrated are presumptively illegal and raise significant antitrust
concerns, including risks of increased prices and reductions in the number
of services available.43 Furthermore, while health insurance companies
may suggest that concentration is not enough to bar mergers because rival
insurers can enter into markets, “years of DOJ enforcement actions have
shown that entry barriers into health insurer markets are substantial.”44
This section will highlight some of the negative impacts of health insurance
megamergers. If left unchecked, companies like Aetna and Anthem who
already have such a substantial share of the market could use their political
lobbying power to eliminate competition and make these impacts a reality
to the detriment of the consumers.

39. Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Acquire Humana for $37 Billion, Combined Entity to Drive ConsumerFocused, High-Value Health Care, Press Release (July 3, 2015), http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20150702005935/en/Aetna-Acquire-Humana-37-Billion-Combined-Entity#.VZYp
MeTD9OI [https://perma.cc/9TD2-J7J8].
40. Id.
41. Anthem, Inc., Anthem Announces Definitive Agreement to Acquire Cigna Corporation, BUS.
WIRE (July 24, 2015), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150724005167/en/Anthem-Announ
ces-Definitive-Agreement-Acquire-Cigna-Corporation [https://perma.cc/NR62-ARVP].
42. See David W. Emmons & Jose R. Guardado, Competition In Health Insurance: A
Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets, AM. MED. ASSOC. (2014). The Herfindal-Hirschman Index
(HHI) is used to measure market concentration. “The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of
each firm competing in the market and summing the resulting numbers.” The HHI factors in the
relative size distribution of the firms in a market. The HHI is frequently used by the DOJ and FTC.
https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index, [https://perma.cc/9QLJ-2M29].
43. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 5.3
(Aug. 19, 2010).
44. David Balto & James Kovacs, Health Insurane Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just say ‘No’,
LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-frenzywhy-doj-must-just-say-no; see, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Aetna Inc. and Prudential Insurance
Co. of Am., No. 3-99CV 1398-H (N.D. Tex. June 21, 1999) (finding that it was unlikely that new
insurers would enter and compete with the newly formed Aetna/Prudential in Houston and Dallas
“because of the costs and difficulties of doing so”).
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A. INCREASED NEGOTIATION POWER
The idea is simple enough: when health insurance companies merge,
they leverage their combined market power and resources when negotiating
with health care providers, leading to cost savings and improved quality.
While large health insurance companies claim that mergers amongst
themselves allow them to gain more leverage to negotiate with providers at
the benefit of the consumer, Thomas Greaney’s Sumo Wrestler theory
suggests otherwise. His theory suggests that when two dominant entities
like a large-scale health care provider and a national health insurance
company come together to negotiate, what is likely to result is a
“handshake rather than an honest negotiation.”45 That is, instead of using
their market power to negotiate a deal to benefit consumers, the two entities
are more likely to negotiate a deal that benefits themselves. Precedent
supports Greaney’s theory. In West Penn Allegheny v. UPMC and
Highmark, the dominant insurer in the Pittsburg area, Highmark, reached
an agreement with the largest health system, University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center (UPMC).46 The agreement protected the insurer against
competition and harmed the health system’s only hospital rival, West
Penn.47 Even more notable, executives of Partners HealthCare, the
dominant hospital system in Massachusetts, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, a dominant insurer, negotiated an agreement that would
make insurance more expensive statewide.48 The agreement stipulated that
Blue Cross would increase insurance payments to Partners’ doctors and
hospitals.49 In return, Partners would push other insurers to pay more for
services rendered.50 This agreement, known as a most favored nations
provision, would ensure that all major insurers would face millions in cost
increases by forcing them to pay more to compete with Blue Cross.51 To
avoid potential antitrust violations, Partners and Blue Cross effectuated the
agreement with a literal handshake, being sure not to leave a paper trail.52
Agreements like these ultimately hurt the consumers. Even when the
dominant player is successful in bargaining with providers, it has little
45. Thomas Greaney, New Health Care Symposium: Dubious Health Care Merger Justifications
– The Sumo Wrestler and “Government Made Me Do It” Defenses, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 24,
2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/24/dubious-health-care-merger-justifications-the-sumowrestler-and-government-made-me-do-it-defenses/ [http://perma.cc/49M3-HXXX].
46. Id.; see also Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
47. Greaney, supra note 45.
48. Scott Allen & Marcella Bombardieri, et al., A Handshake That Made Healthcare History,
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 28, 2008), https://www.bostonglobe.com/specials/2008/12/28/handshake-thatmade-healthcare-history/QiWbywqb8olJsA3IZ11o1H/story.html [https://perma.cc/YT3N-LYQS].
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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incentive to pass the savings on to its policy holders.53 Further, even if the
negotiations lowered rates for consumers, it would likely “lead to a
reduction in the quantity or degradation in the quality of physician
services.”54
Former policy director of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal
Trade Commission, David Balto, suggested that the mergers would lead to
an increase in monopsony power.55 Monopsony power is “the power to
reduce reimbursement for health care providers.”56 Monopsony power
gives health insurers a bigger bargaining chip against health care providers
in terms of controlling the market in their favor (i.e., more restricted
networks, contrived shortages of medical care,57 etc.). While health
insurers contend that increased monopsony power will lead to lower prices
for consumers, the reality is that health insurance providers like Anthem,
Aetna, Cigna, and Humana already have huge negotiating power. Balto
suggests that rather than lowering premiums, the post-merger monopsony
power will result in reduced “availability and affordability of health
insurance for millions of consumers.”58 Further, reducing reimbursement
for health care providers can harm several provider markets and lead to
shortages of health care providers and less service for patients.59 According
to the American Association of Family Practitioners, increased monopsony
power will likely lead to more restricted networks, which “would only be
exacerbated if a single insurer held greater influence over any potential
market, state, or regionpotentially separating patients from their
physicians and community hospitals.”60 Thus, the potential benefit of
increased negotiation power as a result of a megamerger is unlikely to
confer to the consumers.
Increased negotiation power is not limited to negotiations with
providers. As demonstrated by the health insurance mega-mergers, larger
companies will likely have more political lobbying power. Because of
their substantial share of the market and their negotiation power, both
53. Greaney, supra note 45; see also Leemore Dafny, Mark Duggan &Subramaniam
Ramanarayanan, Paying a Premium on your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance
Industry, http://www.bu.edu/sph/files/2010/10/Dafny-Duggan-Ramanarayanan.pdf.
54. Leemore Dafny, Mark Duggan, & Subramaniam Ramanarayanan, Paying a Premium on Your
Premium? Consolidation in the US Health Insurance Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161, 1183 (2012).
55. David Balto & James Kovacs, Health Insurance Merger Frenzy: Why DOJ Must Just say
‘No’, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/683500/health-insurance-merger-fren
zy-why-doj-must-just-say-no [https://perma.cc/TM5U-MP8M].
56. Id.
57. Laurie J. Bates & Rexford E. Santerre, Do health insurers possess monopsony power in the
hospital services industry?, 8 INTL. J. OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND ECON. 1, 2 (2008).
58. Balto & Kovacs, supra note 55, citing Letter from Reid Blackwelder, Board Chair, AAFP, to
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, FTC (June 4, 2015), available at http://goo.gl/vk4lHM.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Aetna and Humana were emboldened to attempt to negotiate with the
federal government. Additionally, because of the financial resources they
have, both companies were able to throw their support behind key political
players that would be able to make political decisions to benefit their
companies. Although these health insurance companies claim that
increased negotiation power is beneficial to the consumers, it is more than
likely that the companies will use it for their own financial gain to the
detriment of the consumers.
B. COST INCREASE OF HEALTH CARE PREMIUMS
While there is evidence that suggests that larger insurers have the
ability to pay providers less,61 research has shown that health insurance
mergers often result in premium increases for consumers.62 In a study done
on the effect of health insurance mergers on policy premiums, researchers
found that exchange premiums are responsive to competition.63 The study
found that when insurance markets become more concentrated, premiums
are highly likely to increase, rather than decrease like the health insurance
companies claim.64
Another study conducted by the American Medical Association
(AMA) found that physicians who practice in areas with low competition
tended to charge more for office visits than physicians who practiced in
areas with high competition.65 This further demonstrates that decreased
competition negatively impacts consumers by increasing costs. Without an
increase in quality or any other reasonable justification, concentration alone
should not determine the price of health care.
C. QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ON POLICIES UNLIKELY
Decreased competition also negatively impacts consumers by reducing
the incentive to improve the quality of care. The AMA suggested that if
the mergers were successful, the health insurance companies would feel
less pressure to offer broader networks to compete for members or respond
61. Glenn A. Melnick, Yu-Chu Shen, & Vivian Yaling Wu, The Increased Concentration Of
Health Plan Markets Can Benefit Consumers Through Lower Hospital Prices, 30 HEATH AFFAIRS,
1728, 1728–33 (2011).
62. Leemore S. Dafny, The Risks of Health Insurance Company Mergers, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sep.
24, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/the-risks-of-health-insurance-company-mergers [https://perma.cc/
J5XT-3QWE].
63. Leemore S. Dafny, Jonathan Gruber, & Christopher Ody, More Insurers Lower Premiums,
AM. J. OF HEALTH ECON. (2015), 5378, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/
10.1162/AJHE_a_00003.
64. Id.; see also Dafny, supra note 62; Leemore Dafny, “Health Insurance Industry
Consolidation: What Do We Know From the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the ACA, and What Should
We Ask?” Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 22, 2015, at 10.
65. Infra note 78.
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to the access needs of patients.66 Thus, patients would likely find
themselves forced to go to out-of-network providers to receive care,67
which shifts the costs from the insurer to the seemingly insuredresulting
in a cost savings for the insurance companies.
Some research has shown that competition can affect the quality of
health plans. In a study done in 2003 on consumer surplus relating to the
Medicare HMO program, researchers found that “all other facts being
equal, the more rivals in a geographic area, the greater the availability of
prescription drug benefits.”68 Thus, health insurance companies like Aetna,
Humana, Anthem, and Cigna should not be allowed to merge because they
will not feel obligated to improve quality, which is a key component in
maintaining competition.
D. INCREASED INNOVATION UNLIKELY
Innovation is essential to fostering competition in the marketplace.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) contends that megamergers
are likely to result in decreased innovation.69 The AMA mirrored that
sentiment finding that contrary to the health insurers’ claims that the
mergers will enable them to innovate patient care, “large insurers are not
more likely to implement the innovative payment and care management
programs that benefit employers and individual patients.”70 In fact,
“concerted delivery system reform efforts have tended to emerge from
other sources, such as provider systems . . . and non-national payers,” not
commercial health insurers.71 Since innovation is a key component in
keeping the marketplace competitive, health insurance megamergers
could pose a major threat to competition in the health insurance industry.
Although large health insurance companies laud the benefits of
megamergers, the mergers can have negative impacts on consumers to the
benefit of the companies, including higher costs and decreased quality of

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Dafney, supra note 62, citing Robert Town & Su Liu, The Welfare Impact of Medicare
HMOs, 34 RAND J. OF ECON. (2003) 4. This study was done prior to the enactment of Medicare Part
D, which funded drug benefits for nearly all Medicare enrollees.
69. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Hospital Association, No. 17-5024, https://assets.doc
umentcloud.org/documents/3519060/American-Hospital-Association.pdf.
70. American Medical Association, The Anthem-CIGNA and Aetna-Humana Mergers: Putting
Profits Ahead of Patients, 3, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/InsuranceMerger-Myth-Reality.pdf.
71. American Medical Association, The Anthem-CIGNA and Aetna-Humana Mergers: Putting
Profits Ahead of Patients, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/Insurance-Merg
er-Myth-Reality.pdf citing Dafny, “Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know From
the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the ACA, and What Should We Ask?” Testimony before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 22, 2015, at 6.
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premiums. Mega-mergers such as Anthem-Cigna and Aetna-Humana have
to potential to threaten competition and harm the consumers, which is why
the government must intervene in order to protect competition in the health
insurance market.

II. THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE
THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Despite the health insurance industry being one of the largest and most
lucrative industries in the United States, the McCarran-Ferguson Act might
allow health insurance companies to try to avoid federal antitrust
enforcement. Left unregulated, health insurance companies have the
potential to grow so large that they can harm the market and consumers.
This should not be the case and was not the case in the Anthem-Cigna and
Aetna-Humana mergers, as discussed below.
Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act in 1945 in response to
the 1944 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Association, in which the Court determined that the federal
government had the authority to regulate insurance companies under the
Commerce Clause, which included antitrust regulation.72 The Act provides
that “the business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the law of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.”73 The McCarranFerguson Act stipulates that
federal antitrust regulations (i.e., the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
Federal Trade Commission Act, etc.) shall apply to the business of
insurance “to the extent that such business is not regulated by State Law.”74
Under the Act, the antitrust exemption pertains to activities that “(1)
constitute the “business of insurance,” (2) are “regulated by State law,” and
(3) do not constitute an agreement or act to “boycott, coerce, or
intimidate.”75
Turning to the first element, the business of insurance is not allencompassing and does not include all activities of insurance companies.76
While mergers are not considered the “business of insurance,”77 this note
72. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 546.
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015, 1012(a) (1988).
74. § 1012(b).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1013; see also Michael Cowie, Health Insurance
and Federal Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Recent Congressional Action, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec
2009) at 1.
76. Michael Cowie, Health Insurance and Federal Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Recent
Congressional Action, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (Dec 2009), 2.
77. Robert Cyran, The Regulatory Hurdles to Health Insurance Mergers, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(July 24, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/25/business/dealbook/the-regulatory-hurdles-to-
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focuses on Aetna and Anthem’s conduct in their pursuit of the mergers.
Courts have typically interpreted the second criterion, regulation by State
law, for McCarran-Ferguson exemption broadly. However, because the
federal government has already established through the Affordable Care
Act that the health insurance exchanges will be largely left to the individual
States for regulation, both Aetna and Anthem satisfy this criterion. Thus,
this analysis focuses on the first and third elements in each of the Aetna
and Anthem cases.
Finally, turning to the last criterion for antitrust exemption, an entity is
exempt from federal antitrust liability if its conduct does not constitute an
agreement or act to boycott, coerce, or intimidate. By definition, a boycott
is a refusal to deal with another in unrelated transactions in order to achieve
terms desired in targeted transaction.78 In St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Barry, the Court concluded that the term “boycott”
included “concerted refusals to deal with parties who were not
competitors.79
AETNA
In order to determine what activities constitute the business of
insurance under the parameters of the McCarranFerguson Act, courts
must consider (1) whether the conduct has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder’s risk, (2) whether the conduct is an integral part
of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, and (3)
whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.80
Here the conduct in question is Aetna’s withdrawal from the marketplace
exchanges as a response to the DOJ’s suit to enjoin the merger with
Humana.
In this case, because Aetna is a health insurance provider, their
conduct has the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder’s risk.
In other words, when policyholders contracted with Aetna for insurance,
the policyholders’ risk was spread throughout the other Aetna
policyholders in their risk pool. Aetna’s withdrawal affected the coverage
of their consumers that had policies through the marketplace exchanges by
transferring the risk back to the individual policyholders. Moreover, their
conduct is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured because withdrawing from the exchanges directly affected
health-insurance-mergers.html [https://perma.cc/2CUA-MN5W].
78. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993).
79. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81 at 104 (1983), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss1/3; citing St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
80. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
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Aetna’s consumers. Aetna policyholders in those particular markets were
left without insurance and had to seek different coverage as a result of the
withdrawal. Aetna effectively ended their relationship with those
policyholders. Lastly, Aetna’s conduct is limited to entities within the
insurance industry because the marketplace exchanges were established for
private health insurance companies. Therefore, Aetna’s conduct satisfies
the first prong for McCarran-Ferguson exemption and should constitute the
“business of insurance.”
Turning to the third prong for McCarran-Ferguson exemption, Aetna
withdrew from the federally established health insurance exchanges in an
attempt to influence the Department of Justice to relent in its action against
Aetna. In fact, the court concluded that Aetna’s reasoning for withdrawing
was to improve its litigation position.81 In this case, a court could consider
Aetna’s refusal to participate in the health insurance exchanges a boycott
against the federal government in order to achieve their desired transaction
—a successful merger with Humana. Moreover, Aetna’s conduct,
including their letter to the Department of Justice, may be characterized as
coercion or intimidation.
Although Aetna’s conduct constitutes the “business of insurance” and
is regulated by state law, Aetna may not be able to escape federal antitrust
liability because their withdrawal may be considered a boycott. Further, a
court could consider their withdrawal, in conjunction with their letter to the
DOJ, an attempt to coerce and intimidate the government to change its
position on the merger.
ANTHEM
In contrast to Aetna, Anthem has yet to take any affirmative action,
rendering the McCarran-Ferguson Act inapplicable. Anthem’s political
lobbying, although transparent, does not violate antitrust laws. However, it
raises concerns about the ability of major health insurance companies to
utilize their market power to influence politics to their advantage.
Anthem’s behavior shows that the health insurance companies, particularly
the biggest players in the industry (i.e., Anthem, Aetna, Humana, and
Cigna) have grown so large that they are emboldened to challenge the
federal government and destabilize insurance markets for their own
business gain.
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows health insurers to try to
avoid federal antitrust enforcement, it is not always the case. Health
insurers cannot always escape enforcement, as was the case in both the
Aetna and Anthem mergers. Without any federal regulation, particularly
81.

Supra note 6, at 19293.
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antitrust regulation, health insurance companies have the ability to grow so
large that they can completely control the marketplace. However, antitrust
laws like the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and Federal Trade Commission
Act can help combat the problem, as discussed below.

III.

ANTITRUST REGULATION

The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are
tasked with protecting competition in the marketplace through the
enforcement of antitrust laws such as the Clayton Act, Sherman Act, and
Federal Trade Commission Act. These pieces of legislation allow the DOJ
and FTC to punish anticompetitive behavior to prevent further
consolidation of the marketplace and protect consumers. This section
discusses whether Aetna and Anthem’s merger conduct, specifically the
tactics they used, violated antitrust laws.
A. THE CLAYTON ACT
The Clayton Act Section 7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that
“may . . . substantially . . . lessen competition or tend to create a
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
monopoly.”82
Commission typically enforce Section 7, although state attorneys general
and private parties can also enforce Section 7, pursuant to Section 4 or 16
of the Clayton Act.83 Typically, when a merger is under review, the court
will analyze whether the challenge is appropriate under Section 7. A
merger is subject to challenge if it is “likely to encourage one or more firms
to raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm
consumers.”84 HartScott Rodino filings often triggers Section 7 review.85
Under the Hart Scott Rodino Act, parties who want to acquire another
entity must file a detailed report to the Federal Trade Commission and the
Department of Justice prior to completing the merger or transferring any
securities or assets if the combined assets of the two companies would
exceed a 323 million dollar threshold.86 Here, both Aetna and Anthem’s
respective 37 billion dollar and 52.4 billion dollar attempted mergers well
exceeded the 323 million dollar threshold.
In order to determine if a merger violates Section 7, courts will
typically conduct a rule of reason analysis. Courts will analyze and define
the relevant markets, the companies’ market share, and if the merger will
82. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), 26.
84. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (updated as of Feb. 27, 2017).
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result in a highly concentrated market.87 The Department of Justice
brought suits against Aetna and Anthem for their attempted mergers and
eventually prevailed.88 The court in both cases found that the Aetna and
Anthem mergers would substantially lessen competition based on findings
of market share and concentration.89 Because Section 7 was already
addressed in detail by the courts,90 this note will not go into further detail
regarding the mergers as they relate to the Clayton Act. Rather, this note
will discuss the tactics that Aetna and Anthem employed to ensure the
success of their respective mergers and why those tactics should raise
concerns for the government and consumers.
B. THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act also regulates competition and the behavior of
competitors in any given market. Congress passed the Sherman Act in
1890.91 The Act generally prohibits anticompetitive business activities:92
Section 1 targets and prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct,
whereas Section 2 focuses on results that are anticompetitive in nature.93
Because Section 2 focuses on results, and the court already decided to
enjoin both mergers, this note will not address Section 2. Rather, this
section will address Section 1 as it relates to Aetna and Anthem’s conduct.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “prohibits every contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”94 In order to determine
whether an action violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts will turn to
the elements as follows: (1) a conspiracy or agreement, (2) which
unreasonably restrains competition, (3) and which affects interstate
commerce.95 Anthem pulled out of the marketplace on their own volition.
Because there was no agreement with Cigna, the Sherman Act does not
apply in this case. Similarly, Aetna’s conduct does not amount to a
conspiracy or agreement with another entity either. Therefore, the
Sherman Act is not applicable to both of the mergers discussed in this note.
C. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) was created with the sole
87. Id.
88. Supra note 6, and United States v. Anthem, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23613.
89. Id.
90. Supra note 6, and United States v. Anthem, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23613.
91. 15 USCA §§ 1-7.
92. Id.
93. Wex Antitrust Overview, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust
[https://perma.cc/R4HQ-K3MS].
94. 15 USCS § 1.
95. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917 (1981).
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objective to “protect the process of competition for the benefit of
consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to
operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”96 The FTCA
established the Federal Trade Commission, which granted the FTC the
power to prohibit and prevent anti-competitive practices.97 Under the
FTCA, “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” are
prohibited.98 The FTCA allows the Commission to “seek monetary redress
and other relief for conduct injurious to consumers, prescribe rules defining
with specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and
establishing requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices,”
among other things.99
To determine if a practice is unfair, courts will assess if the practice
(1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, (2) cannot
be reasonably avoided by consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. Courts may also
take public policy, regulation, or judicial decisions into consideration in
conjunction with all other evidence in making their determination.100 An
act or practice is considered deceptive where (1) a representation, omission,
or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer, (2) a consumer’s
interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is considered
reasonable under the circumstances, and (3) the misleading representation,
omission, or practice is material.101
This section assesses whether Aetna and Anthem’s conduct
constituted unfair or deceptive activities under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
AETNA
Unfairness
To reiterate, a practice is unfair if it (1) causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers, (2) cannot be reasonably avoided by
consumers, and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.102
Charles Gaba, founder of ACAsignups.net which extensively tracks
96. The Antitrust Laws, Fed. Trade Comm., ftc.gov (2016).
97. 15 USCS § 45 (1890).
98. 15 USCS § 45(a)(1).
99. Federal Trade Commission Act, FED. TRADE COMM. https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/
statutes/federal-trade-commission-act [https://perma.cc/ZB4P-94SF].
100. 15 USCS § 45(n).
101. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F2d 1431, 1436 (1986).
102. 15 USCS § 45(n).
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ACA enrollment in detail, estimates that 600,000 Aetna policyholders will
be affected by Aetna’s withdrawal from the exchanges.103 600,000
previously insured Aetna policyholders will no longer have coverage,
placing them at risk of having uncovered medical bills or being subject to a
penalty fee per the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.104 Because
Aetna’s withdrawal left their policyholders either without coverage, having
to find different coverage, or having to choose an alternative coverage
option that they had not originally contracted for, a substantial number of
their policyholders sustained a substantial injury.
Further, while
policyholders can arguably shop around for a different policy, Aetna
policyholders must do so after the fact. Because the conduct was a
unilateral decision on Aetna’s part, its policyholders could not avoid losing
coverage. Thus, Aetna’s withdrawal satisfies the second element because
consumers could not reasonably avoid the conduct. Finally, to determine
that Aetna’s practice was unfair, Aetna’s withdrawal must not be
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.
Here, Aetna stated that it withdrew from the exchanges due to financial
reasons, despite the fact that they were actually profiting in those
markets.105 Aetna asserted that they, along with the other major payers
have “experienced continued financial stress within their individual public
exchange business” and that in order to provide affordable, highquality
health care options to consumers, they need to withdraw from the
exchanges.106 Although Aetna may benefit its consumers as a whole by
increasing its financial solvency, withdrawing from the exchanges does not
benefit the consumers injured by its conduct nor does it benefit
competition. Therefore, Aetna’s conduct constitutes an unfair practice
under Section 5 because its withdrawal from the exchanges does not
outweigh the countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.
Based on the analysis above, Aetna’s withdrawal from the
marketplace exchanges constitutes an unfair practice because its
withdrawal caused substantial injury to consumers, could not be reasonably
avoided by consumers, and was not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition. Given these assessments, it seems likely
that the FTC could sustain a claim against Aetna for violation of the FTCA.

103. Charles Gaba, OK, How Many People Will HAVE to Shop Around This Fall, AFFORABLE
CARE ACT SIGNUPS (Aug. 17, 2016), http://acasignups.net/16/08/29/update-x2-ok-how-many-peoplewill-have-shop-around-fall [https://perma.cc/YUV7-RUBM].
104. 26 USCS § 5000A(b)(1).
105. Aetna, Inc., Aetna to Narrow Individual Public Exchange Participation, Press Release (Aug.
15, 2016), https://news.aetna.com/news-releases/aetna-to-narrow-individual-public-exchange-participa
tion/ [https://perma.cc/NY2A-XU46].
106. Id.

LIENBAD MERGERS FINAL 11.19%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2019

HEALTH INSURANCE MEGA-MERGERS

12/13/2018 10:32 AM

147

Deception
Under the FTCA, an act or practice is considered deceptive where (1)
a representation, omission, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the
consumer, (2) a consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission,
or practice is considered reasonable under the circumstances, and (3) the
misleading representation, omission, or practice is material and is likely to
cause injury to a reasonable relying consumer.107
While Aetna claimed that they withdrew from the exchanges due to a
loss of profits from their participation, the court found otherwise.108 The
court determined that Aetna threatened the Department of Justice and
withdrew from the exchanges in order to improve the outcome of its
merger litigation.109 In fact, Aetna withdrew from exchanges in some states
and counties that were actually profitable, indicating that the reasons
provided in the letter and in subsequent press releases were misleading to
the public.110
If evidence can be found that Aetna’s policyholders in those markets
were mislead by Aetna’s claim, relied on it, and sustained an injury, such
as leaving their exchange plan for a more expensive private plan because
they thought the exchanges were failing, then the FTC may be able to
penalize Aetna for deceptive behavior. Otherwise, although Aetna’s
representation may be misleading, Aetna policyholders’ loss of coverage
cannot be traceable to their reliance on Aetna’s representation that their
withdrawal was for financial reasons. Rather their injury was caused by
Aetna’s unilateral decision to withdraw. Thus, although Aetna was
deceptive in their motive to withdraw participation, the Section 5 deception
practices assessment does not apply here, unless evidence can support
otherwise.
ANTHEM
Anthem recently pulled out the exchanges in several states including
Nevada, Maine, and Ohio and drastically reduced their presence in states
like California and Georgia.111 If evidence can be found that Anthem’s

107. Supra note 101.
108. United States v. Aetna Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 1, 74 (D.D.C. 2017).
109. Id. at 82.
110. Id. at 74; Aetna, supra note 105.
111. Tami Luhby, Anthem exits more Obamacare markets, CNN MONEY (Aug. 7, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/07/news/economy/anthem-obamacare/index.html [https://perma.cc/T8
VG-DZK3]; Pauline Bartolone, Anna Gorman; Chad Terhune, Anthem’s Retreat Leaves Californians
With Fewer Choices, More Worries, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://khn.org/news/
anthems-retreat-leaves-californians-with-fewer-choices-more-worries/ [https://perma.cc/46MC-9Y5Q];
Dwyer Gunn, Anthem Pulls Out of Nevada’s ACA Exchanges Entirely, PACIFIC STANDARD (Aug. 7,
2017), https://psmag.com/news/anthem-pulls-out-of-nevada-aca-exchanges [https://perma.cc/JCM5-
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withdrawals were motivated for the same reasons as Aetna’s withdrawals
(i.e., to effectuate their merger), then the FTCA may have a case against
Anthem.
Anthem’s political power moves, while manipulative, are not against
antitrust laws. Despite Anthem’s unwillingness to relent to court decisions
to enjoin the merger with Cigna and its lack of political transparency, the
current antitrust laws do not have the ability to control the kind of political
influence large corporations like Anthem can assert. Although ultimately,
antitrust laws served its purpose and protected consumers against the
mergers, permissive lobbying allows for manipulation of the system, as is
shown in this case.
Considering the analysis above, the Federal Trade Commission should
investigate Aetna and potentially Anthem for their unfair conduct. In doing
so, large health insurance companies like Aetna and Anthem will be
deterred from using their market power and influence to harm the
government and the consumers. Aetna’s withdrawal from the exchanges
has already had a significant impact on the marketplace exchanges in that it
caused a ripple effect. Anthem, Humana, and Cigna followed Aetna’s
footsteps and released statements in which they said they were planning to
pull out of the exchanges or they are at least assessing the option of doing
so.112 The current state of the health insurance exchanges could collapse if
this behavior is left unchecked.
Even so, federal antitrust enforcement agencies like the FTC still
cannot protect competition from the companies’ political lobbying tactics,
as is demonstrated with Anthem. This exposes a loophole for major health
insurance companies to influence the federal government. Because of the
vast resources these companies havefinancial, political, or otherwise, the
companies could drastically impact competition and like Anthem, become
audacious enough to directly threaten the government. Lobbying allows
big corporations like Aetna and Anthem to reach into their deep pockets
and essentially turn their dollars into policy, which should not be the case
in a modern, capitalist society.
Legislation reform can help tackle the health insurance companies
abusing their power, both politically and in the market. Legislators should
RN43]; Leslie Small, Anthem pulls out of Maine’s ACA Exchange, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/aca/anthem-maine-exit-aca-exchange-no-bare-counties [https:
//perma.cc/8L3R-W9JT]; Jordan Weissman, A Major Insurer Just Pulled Out of Obamacare in
Ohioand It Basically Blamed Trump, SLATE (June 6, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2017/06/06/anthem_pulls_out_of_ohio_s_obamacare_exchanges_basically_blames_trump.html [https://
perma.cc/Q6F7-ZAA3].
112. Baylee Pulliam, Aetna’s playing hardbal –now others are too, BIZJOURNALS (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/news/2016/08/29/aetnas-playing-hardball-now-others-are-too.
html [https://perma.cc/N9J5-U484].
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introduce stronger antitrust laws as a first line of defense, as well as stricter
lobbying laws in order to deter companies from gaining too much power
that they are able to manipulate the government. However, short of
legislation reform, another way that the federal government can address
this lobbying loophole altogether is to overhaul the whole system and
transition to a single payer system, which is discussed in the following
section.

IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTION: SINGLE PAYER SYSTEM
Aetna and Anthem were so intent on effectuating their mergers that
both companies were willing to use any means necessary to ensure success.
Although their attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, their conduct
demonstrated that political lobbying can be a powerful and potentially
dangerous tool for major health insurance companies to manipulate the
executive branch and subvert existing judicial oversight. Our current
capitalist health insurance system depends on competition. When major
health insurance companies use their market power as political lobbying
power to promote anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, it doubly
threatens competition. However, a singlepayer system could all but
eliminate the health insurance companies’ ability to engage in conduct like
that of Aetna and Anthem’s as well as provide a major benefit to
consumersactual coverage.
Prior to the ACA, 32 out of 33 developed nations had universal health
care, with the United States being the one exception.113
The
implementation of the ACA changed that by introducing the individual
mandate. Even with the individual mandate, eleven percent of U.S. adults
remain uninsured.114 With the increasing complexities and political
uncertainty surrounding the health care system in the United States, the
once impossible singlepayer system, now seems politically viable. A
singlepayer system is a system in which “the governmentnot the
employercollects the health insurance premiums of all Americans in the
form of payroll or income taxes.”115 The money goes into a health security
trust fund established by the federal government and then distributed to the
states.116 Each state then pays health care providers directly (i.e., hospitals,

113. List of Countries with Universal Healthcare (Feb. 8, 2018), https://truecostblog.com/2009/08/
09/countries-with-universal-healthcare-by-date/#link1 [https://perma.cc/JHY8-52NT].
114. Stephanie Marken, U.S. Uninsured Rate Remains at Historical Low of 11.0%, GALLUP, (July
11, 2016) http://www.gallup.com/poll/193556/uninsured-rate-remains-historical-low.aspx [https://per
ma.cc/QV2B-WJZZ].
115. Jim McDemott, Single-Payer Makes Cents, 27 BILL RTS J. 11, 12 (1994).
116. Id.
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physicians, etc.) for their services.117 Payments can be made in various
ways: fee for service, bundled payment, episodic payment, capitated
payment, payment for value, to name a few. In a single payer system the
federal or state government can negotiate payments for services, or the
government can contract with outside entities for the healthcare services
like Canada does.118 In some instances, the single payer model has
transformed into socialized medical care, where the government employs,
establishes, and operates their own doctors and hospitals, similar to the
system in the United Kingdom,119 but this need not be the case in the
United States. The two do not go hand-in-hand.
Successful single payer models have shown that it is possible for a
country to have inexpensive, reliable healthcare for all that does not
bankrupt the economy.120 For example, Thailand’s healthcare system is
notably one of the most successful implementations of a singlepayer
system to date. In 2000, Thailand was in a healthcare crisis.121 Roughly a
quarter of Thailand’s population was uninsured, and several of the insured
had inadequate policies.122 An estimated twenty percent of the poorest Thai
homes became impoverished as a result of out-of-pocket healthcare
spending.123 The following year, Thailand introduced “one of the most
ambitious healthcare reforms ever undertaken in a developing country.”124
Ten years later, ninty eight percent of the population, about forty-eight
million Thai people, had insurance.125
Since the program’s
implementation, Thailand’s mortality rates significantly dropped, and life
expectancy has increased.126 The program improved health outcomes for
millions of Thai people at the cost of $80 per person annually.127 This is a
stark contrast from the over $10,000 spent per person in the United
States.128
117. Id.
118. Philip Kotler, It’s Time For a Single-Payer Healthcare System, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 25,
2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/its-time-for-a-single-payer-healthcare-system_us_58d64
70de4b0f633072b37f8 [https://perma.cc/FL25-227L].
119. Id.
120. Amartya Sen, Universal Health Care: The Affordable Dream, HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV.
(2015), http://harvardpublichealthreview.org/universal-health-care-the-affordable-dream/ [https://perm
a.cc/N6FD-9HS2].
121. Sue George, What Thailand Can Teach The World About Universal Healthcare, THE
GUARDIAN (May 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/health-revolution/2016/may/24/thailand-uni
ver sal-healthcare-ucs-patients-government-political [https://perma.cc/ZC56-43UT].
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. citing the book Millions Saved: New Cases of Proven Success in Global Health.
125. Id.
126. Sen, supra note 120.
127. George, supra note 121.
128. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, $10,345 per person: U.S. health care spending reaches new peak,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 13, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/new-peak-us-health-care-
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Single payer models can also be successful in developed countries as
well. An example of a successful single payer system in the developed
country is Taiwan. In 1995, Taiwan adopted a National Health Insurance
(NHI) system.129 Prior to its implementation, roughly fifty-seven percent of
the Taiwanese population was insured by a number of health insurers.130
Per Taiwan’s NHI, every Taiwanese citizen has an identification card, and
it includes a brief medical history.131 Each person must bring their card
every time they utilize a medical service.132 The card allows hospitals to
claim the charges, tracked by the cards, from the government.133 This
system enables rapid claims processing for healthcare providers.134
Although the program is government-run, Taiwan relies on private
healthcare providers for healthcare services. Thus, health care providers
still compete for patients. Some of the strengths of Taiwan’s NHI include
good accessibility, comprehensive coverage, short waiting times, low cost,
high coverage rate, and a nationwide research databank, which allows the
government to conduct research to track public health outcomes.135
However, some of the weaknesses of Taiwan’s NHI include reduced
quality of outpatient visits and a shortage of funding.136 Because of the
programs convenience and affordability, coupled with “a high level of
health seeking behavior” in Taiwan, general practitioners often see above
average numbers of patients each day.137 This results in extremely short
consultation times, typically no more than five minutes of physician time,
which in turn leads to a decrease in quality because physicians are unable
to spend quality time to assess the patient’s needs.138 Regardless, the NHI
consistently receives satisfaction rates about seventy percent, and the
Taiwanese have improved health outcomes.139 Moreover, Taiwan’s health
care system costs about $2,595 per capita and covers 99.9% of its
population, which is considerably different from the United States for both
metrics.140
spen ding-10345-per-person [https://perma.cc/8QSC-LSNU].
129. Wai-Yin Wu, Azeem Majeed, & Ken Kuo, An Overview of the Healthcare System in Taiwan,
3 LONDON J. OF PRIMARY CARE 115, 115 (2010) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3960712/pdf/LJPC-03-115.pdf.
130. Id. at 116.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 117.
136. Id. at 118.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Tsung-Mei Cheng, The Taiwan Health Care System, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
http://international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/YD6Q-J4XK].
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A pure single payer system would eliminate the political abuses and
market manipulations outlined in this note. Without private health
insurance companies, the government is solely accountable for the health
insurance of its citizens. Consequentially, healthcare providers would be
forced to improve costs and exceed quality measures in order to compete
for better reimbursement rates from the government. However, a pure
single payer system is difficult to accomplish, considering the highly
polarized political environment in the United States currently. Some
countries, such as Australia, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have
hybrid systems.141 These hybrids allow people the option of choosing a
private health insurer if they do not want to opt into the government
system, otherwise known as a public option. In this type of system, the
private health insurers must compete with the government-run plans. A
hybrid model may be the most viable option for the United States going
forward, and health insurance companies would have to truly improve costs
and quality to bolster competition, which would benefit the consumers. A
hybrid model will also take away much of the political power and influence
that major health insurance companies have, which will benefit and protect
consumers from political gaming. While the single payer system is not
without its flaws, there are relatively successful models in both developed
and developing countries that can offer the United States some guidance.
Further, it can look to the Medicare system, a semi-single payer system that
already exists in the United States for individuals who are 65 and older, in
which taxpayers pay for a large majority while private entities pay some
parts.142 The U.S. government can use Medicare as a guide to expand the
covered population. With several existing single payer models to look to,
the United States should consider transitioning to a single payer system, or
a hybrid form of it, to deter major health insurance companies from using
their power to harm consumers.
Although there are several benefits and positive examples of single
payer systems, there are some issues to consider. A main issue regarding
single payer systems is solvency. In the Taiwanese model and the
Medicare model, controlling the overall budget poses a problem for the
government. The Taiwanese have had to cut into other government funds
to pay for their citizens’ healthcare, and funding for Medicare is predicted
to run out in 2028.143 Spending can often exceed what is collected from the

141. Kotler, supra note 118.
142. What is Single Payer Healthcare?, HEALTHCARE NOW, https://www.healthcare-now.org/
what-is-single-payer/ [https://perma.cc/ZSC4-NBEP].
143. Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION (2016), http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-facts-on-medicare-spending-andfinancing/ [https://perma.cc/2YQ2-JDKU].
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people by the government. This is an issue that has yet to be resolved.
Solvency aside, the U.S. should still consider transitioning to a hybrid
single payer and private insurer hybrid because the current private
insurance model is becoming increasingly costly and burdensome to
consumers and is likely going to continue to be so due to the rapid
consolidation nature of the industry. Further, doing so would allow the
government to reign in the health insurance companies’ ability to use their
market power and political influence against it because it would shift some
control back to the government.

CONCLUSION
The goal of antitrust regulation should be to ensure the conditions of a
free market and to protect competition in the marketplace.144 With the
health care industry transitioning to a highly capitalized and monetized
environment, antitrust regulation is becoming increasingly important.
Without safeguards in place, health insurance companies have the potential
to destroy competition in the marketplace, which ultimately harms the
consumers. While the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission share the authority to sue to enjoin mega-mergers like the
Aetna-Humana and Anthem-Cigna mergers and stop them from
effectuating, the Federal Trade Commission has the authority to investigate
and prohibit corporations from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices
that are oftentimes used as means to succeed in their merger pursuits. The
Federal Trade Commission should exercise their authority to protect the
process of competition and to prevent large corporations from becoming
bad actors just so they can succeed. These practices can lead to
catastrophic consequences, as we are beginning to see with the marketplace
exchanges.
Alternatively, those issues can be resolved if the government can
move toward a single payer system or a hybrid system. While not entirely
perfect, a single payer system would all but eliminate the negative
behaviors discussed in this note. A hybrid system would be a viable option
for the government to explore because it still allows for competition in the
health insurance market, but it also allows the government to set the
industry standard to reign in bad behavior.
Regardless, the health insurance industry is likely to continue to see
changes and transform, whether it be from political forces or shifts in the
market. The outcome of which is unknown. It is crucial that the U.S.
144. Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the
Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 17 (1993).
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government take steps in order to ensure the health of its citizens and
continue to make strides to achieve healthcare for all and not allow big
health insurance companies to use their market power as political power to
coerce the government or harm competition or the consumers.

